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A Quarter Century of Death:
A Symposium on Capital Punishment
in Virginia since Furman v. Georgia
Introduction
I. Historical Background
In Furman v. Georgia,' the United States Supreme Court found the
death penalty unconstitutional as administered in 1972. The Court's deci-
sion invalidated all capital punishment statutes then in existence. Of the five
Justice majority, two Justices found capital punishment unconstitutional
under all circumstances and three Justices found the death penalty was being
administered in an arbitrary and capricious manner.2 The Court's suspen-
sion of capital punishment proved to be short-lived. Only four years after
Furman, the Court reinstated capital punishment. In Gregg v. Georgia,' the
Court approved capital punishment statutes which provided "guidance" and
"direction" to juries confronted with the option of imposing a sentence of
death.' Jurek v. Texas5 came before the Court on the same day as Gregg. In
Jurek, the Court concluded that, by narrowing capital murder to first degree
murder plus one of five specified aggravating factors and by authorizing the
presentation of mitigating circumstances at a separate sentencing phase,
Texas had brought its capital punishment statute within the confines of
"guided discretion."6 The Court also upheld that part of the Texas capital
sentencing procedures which instructed the jury to consider "whether there
is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society."" In doing so, the
Court sanctioned the use of future dangerousness as an aggravating factor.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (finding then-existing death penalty statutes
unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
3. 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (holding that 'the punishment of death does not invariably
violate the Constitution").
4. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192-98 (1976).
5. 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (finding that the Texas capital sentencing procedures did not
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
6. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
7. Id. at 269 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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After the Court's reinstatement of capital punishment, state legislatures
quickly responded by amending their capital punishment statutes to fit
within the "guided discretion" requirements of Furman and Gregg. Virginia
was no exception. In 1975, the General Assembly responded to Furman by
enacting its own capital punishment statute.8 Section 18.2-31 of the Virginia
Code established a list of substantive offenses which triggered the imposition
of death as a possible sentence.9 In 1977, the General Assembly responded
toJurek by passing sections 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4 of the Virginia Code."
Under these sections, a person who committed one of the substantive
offenses included within section 18.2-31 and who was found to be a "contin-
uing serious threat to society," or to have committed an offense that was
"outrageously or wantonly vile," became eligible for Virginia's new death
penalty. This Symposium will trace some of the substantive and procedural
developments, applications, and deficiencies of capital punishment in
Virginia during the post-Furman v. Georgia era.
II. The Substantive Offenses
A. Virginia Code Annotated S 18.2-31
The first article in this Symposium traces the history of the statutory
expansion of the Virginia capital murder statute." Section 18.2-31 of the
Virginia Code originally made capital three substantive offenses: (1) a
killing in the commission of abduction; (2) a killing committed by another
for hire; and (3) a killing by an inmate in a penal institution or while in the
custody of an employee of the institution. 2  A year later, the General
Assembly added robbery and rape as predicate felonies for capital murder. 3
Since 1975, the General Assembly has continued to expand the substantive
capital murder statute. By 1999, the original capital murder statute had been
expanded from three to twelve subsections.14 Each of these twelve subsec-
tions has been modified or amended by the General Assembly. The addi-
tional subsections do not by themselves convey the extent of the statutory
expansion. Counting attempts for the predicate felonies and each alternative
method of capital murder listed in the statute, there are now twenty-seven
different capital offenses."
8. 1975 Va. Acts, ch. 14, 15.
9. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31 (Michie 1977).
10. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4 (Michie Gum. Supp. 1977).
11. See Hammad S. Matin, Expansion of Section 18.2-31 of the Virginia Code, 12 CAP.
DEF. J. 7 (1999) (Part I this Symposium).
12. 1975 Va. Acts, ch. 14, 15.
13. 1976 Va. Acts, ch. 503.
14. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31 (Michie 1999).
15. See Alix M. Karl, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 449, 455 & n.57 (1998) (analyzing
Payne v. Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 1999) (holding that each offense identified
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After pinpointing the statutory changes, the article explores the moti-
vating forces which sparked the changes. Most of the changes, whether they
added, deleted, or changed the language of the statute, expanded the scope
of capital murder in Virginia. In some situations, a specific decision bythe
Supreme Court of Virginia ignited the legislative drive to ensure that the
capital murder statute was read expansively by the Virginia courts. In other
situations, a particularly horrific crime or systemic problem in society
attracted the attention of the public and the General Assembly. In many
cases, political gamesmanship appears to have played a significant role in the
statutory expansion. The result is a massive statutory expansion of capital
murder. After twenty-five years of legislative expansion, the General
Assembly is still not satisfied. At least six new capital offenses are being
contemplated by the General Assembly.
B. Predicate Felonies in the Capital Context
In addition to legislative action substantially broadening the number
and types of murders that can be capital murder in Virginia, the Virginia
courts have also played a significant role in expanding the scope of capital
murder. The second article in this Symposium discusses the judicial expan-
sion of capital murder in Virginia.1" Judicial expansion in the predicate
felony arena has developed from an alarming trend to a dangerous one. The
current predicate felonies for capital murder are robbery, rape, forcible
sodomy, and object sexual penetration."7 After the General Assembly added
robbery and rape as predicates to capital murder, the Virginia courts began
to interpret these traditional felonies loosely. Over time, the definitions of
robbery and rape have expanded in the capital context. The same trend
appears to be emerging in the context of forcible sodomy and object sexual
penetration, the other statutory predicates for capital murder. Judicial
expansion of these felonies establishes a dangerous standard for capital cases
predicated upon one of these felonies.
III The Sentencing Process
In the years following Furman, expansion of capital murder in Virginia
has not been limited to legislative and judicial enlargement of the substantive
offenses. On the procedural side, the sentencing process has also experi-
enced significant expansion.
within a subsection of section 18.2-31 of the Virginia Code is a separate capital murder)).
16. See Heather L. Necklaus, Predicate Felonies in the Context of Capital Cases, 12 CAP.
DEF. J. 37 (1999) (Part II this Symposium).
17. VA. CODE AmN. S 18.2-31(4)-(5) (Michie 1999).
1999]
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A. The Future Dangerousness Aggravator
Future dangerousness of the defendant was included as one of the
original aggravating factors for imposition of a death sentence. 8 The third
article in this Symposium explores the expansion of the future dangerous-
ness aggravating factor." While the language of the future dangerousness
factor has remained the same, the evidence accepted to prove future danger-
ousness has been expanded. This article will show that the Virginia courts
have misread the statutory sentencing scheme by admitting both prior
criminal conduct and current offense evidence to prove future dangerous-
ness. A natural reading of the statute reserves the circumstances of the
offense for proof of vileness only. The Virginia courts have also accepted
victim impact evidence as relevant to the capital sentencing phase. How-
ever, the purpose of the future dangerousness factor is limited in scope to all
relevant information about the defendant. Because victim impact evidence
focuses on the collateral victims and has no bearing on how dangerous a
defendant will be in the future, it has no logical connection to future danger-
ousness and is therefore irrelevant in the future dangerousness context.
After the General Assembly abolished parole for defendants who had
committed felonies on or after January 1, 1995,20 all defendants who are
convicted of capital murder, whether sentenced to life or death, will die in
prison. Because the only society that a capital murder defendant will ever
know is a prison society, previous fears of future dangerousness to society
at large are erased. Evidence of prison structure and conditions should thus
be admissible as rebuttal to future dangerousness evidence.
B. The Vileness Aggravator
The second original aggravating factor for death is vileness." Although
in Godfrey v. Georgia' the United States Supreme Court found that nothing
in the words "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" gave
the jury any guidance as to their scope or definition,23 the vileness factor in
Virginia has withstood constitutional attack.24 The fourth article in this
Symposium explores the expansion of the vileness factor in Virginia.25
18. VA. CODE ANN. SS 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1977).
19. See Jason J. Solomon, Future Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55
(1999) (Part MI this Symposium).
20. See VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 1999). Although geriatric parole exists
in Virginia, capitally-convicted felons are inelligible. VA. CODE ANN. S 53.140.01 (Michie
1999).
21. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1977).
22. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
23. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980).
24. The capital murder statutes in Virginia and Georgia are identical.
25. See Douglas R. Banghart, Videness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 77 (1999)
[Vol. 12:1
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There are three sub-elements which can be used to prove vileness: (1)
torture; (2) aggravated battery; and (3) depravity of mind.26 The Virginia
courts have expanded the scope of vileness so that any capital murder falls
under one of the three vileness sub-elements. The vileness factor focuses on
the circumstances of the crime and the defendant's conduct during the
crime. Thus, as in the future dangerousness context, victim impact evidence
is irrelevant to a finding of vileness. This article will also explain that, for
the vileness factor to have any legitimacy, the Commonwealth should be
required to specify which of the three sub-elements it will prove, and the
jury should be required to fird that sub-element beyond a reasonable doubt.
C. Proportionality Review
The fifth article in this Symposium analyzes the deficiencies of propor-
tionality review in Virginia. Section 17.1-313 of the Virginia Code man-
dates proportionality review." Proportionality review requires the Supreme
Court of Virginia to conduct a comparative proportionality analysis of
death sentences on an individual basis. This requires the court to compare
the case before them with other capital cases considering both the defendant
and the crime. This review allows the court to determine whether a particu-
lar death sentence is excessive or disproportionate. The Supreme Court of
Virginia's current comparative proportionality review is ineffective for two
reasons. First, it only collects cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of
Virginia. In the vast majority of the collected cases, a death sentence was
imposed. Thus, there is no effective representation in the comparative
analysis of cases where the defendant convicted of capital murder was
sentenced to life. Second, the Supreme Court of Virginia only looks at the
crime and does not comparatively review the defendant.
Section 17.1-313 of the Virginia Code also requires that, upon request
of the defendant, the collection of cases accumulated by the Supreme Court
of Virginia for proportionality review be made available to the circuit
courts. Although this is a statutory duty, presently these cases are not
transmitted to the circuit courts. For proportionality review to be effective,
the circuit courts should have automatic access to the collection of cases
accumulated by the' Supreme Court of Virginia.
(Part IV this Symposium).
26. VA. CODE ANN. SS 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1999).
27. See Kelly E. P. Bennett, ProportionalityReview: TheHistoricalApplication, 12 CAP.
DEF. J. 103 (1999) (Part V this Symposium).
28. VA. CODE ANN. 5 17.1-313 (Michie 1999).
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IV Suggestions for Reform
The first five articles in this Symposium analyze the substantive and
procedural developments of the Virginia capital scheme in the years follow-
ing Furman v. Georgia. These articles identify problems and deficiencies in
the capital murder statute and case law. The final article in this Symposium
explores how these deficiencies can be ameliorated. In addition, the article
discusses the "twenty-one day rule," which is not discussed in the first five
articles. Suggestions for reform are proffered throughout this article.29 The
Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse urges the Virginia judiciary and Gen-
eral Assembly to consider seriously these recommendations and use them
in making needed changes to the Virginia capital murder scheme.
29. See Alix M. Karl, Suggestions for Capital Reform in Virginia, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 123
(1999) (Part VI this Symposium).
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